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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1954
REAL PROPERTY
Adverse Possession
The purpose of the statute of limitation with respect to actions to de-
termine tide to real property is to quiet tides. Therefore, the Clinton
County Court of Appeals in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Romohr properly
held that there is sufficient privity of estate between a purchaser of a lot
at an adminstrator's sale and the heirs and their ancestor to permit the pur-
chaser to tack his adverse possession to the prior adverse possession of the
heirs and of their ancestor. The court also properly held that the transfer
of possession by one person to another is sufficient privity of estate to
permit tacking, and that therefore it is immaterial that the description in
the deed from the administrator to the purchaser did not include the por-
tion of the lot claimed adversely.2 In Ohio many boundary lines have
been inadequately described in deeds or have become uncertain through the
disappearance of monuments. 3 The acquisition of title by adverse posses-
sion is a solution to some of these boundary disputes.
Covenants of Title
The desirability from the purchaser's point of view of receiving a deed
with the usual covenants of title, including the covenant against incum-
brances, is demonstrated by the facts and decision in Espy Realty Co. v.
Burton-Rodgers, Inc4 In this case the grantor was properly held liable on
his covenant against incumbrances for the amount of a special assessment
which the grantee had to pay because the grantor had tapped into a sewer
line without a permit. Although the point was not before the court, in
answer to the grantor's argument that under the assessing ordinance no
lien against the property conveyed could exist prior to the time this
property was connected to the new sewer, the court stated that a lien of this
type exists from the date of the assessment and not from "the maturity of
the assessment as a debt."
With respect to known, unpaid assessments, a purchaser of property may
justifiably request the vendor to deduct from the purchase price any unpaid
assessments for special projects, such as a street, which have been com-
pleted. When a special project has been completed, the value of the im-
'95 Ohio App. 93, 117 N.E.2d 489 (1953).
'4"DFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 436 (3d ed. 1939).
'PMERS, OHIO LANDS 98 (3d ed. 1930); Broadsword v. Kauer, 161 Ohio St. 524,
120 N.E.2d 111 (1954); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Romohr, 95 Ohio App. 93, 117
N.E.2d 489 (1953).
'94 Ohio App. 417, 116 N.E.2d 14 (1952).
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provements is probably included in the selling price of the property; yet
the vendor in the contract of sale may also require the purchaser to pay
the unpaid amount of the special assessment. Consequently, when the
purchaser pays the special assessment he has then probably paid more
than the market value of the property.5
Capacity
The case of Churches of God v. Walden6 involved a construction of
Ohio General Code, Section 10055. The applicable portion of this section
provides that when the trustees of a church organization sell and convey
its real estate "by deed in fee simple" without first receiving the approval
of the court of common pleas of the county in which the real estate is located
and when the grantee and its successors have held "continued, exclusive,
notorious and adverse possession of the real estate" for five years from the
date of conveyance, then the conveyance is as valid as if confirmed by the
court of common pleas. The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals held
that under this section of the Ohio General Code the conveyance by the
trustees of a church without approval of the court of common pleas to a
grantee who enters into, and remains in possession for five years is voidable
during the five-year period but valid thereafter. Consequently, the con-
veyance of church real estate on September 1, 1952, -by the trustees of the
church without court approval is voidable and not void. The grantee under
a deed of September 1, 1952, according to this decision, is now in "adverse
possession," as that phrase is used in Section 10055 of the Ohio General
Code, under a voidable deed. An interesting question is whether this con-
veyance will ever become indefeasible since the provisions of Section
10055 are not included in the Ohio Revised Code.
Section 1702.39 of a proposed Ohio Non-Profit Corporation Law,
which has been prepared by the Corporation Law Committee of the Ohio
State Bar Association, does not require court approval of a sale of the real
estate of a non-profit corporation.7 Subdivision (c) of this proposed
section provides that any action to set aside a conveyance on the ground
that it was made by a non-profit corporation without complying with any
applicable section of the Revised Code must be brought within ninety
days after the conveyance. Since the provisions of Section 10055 of the
Ohio General Code relate to unincorporated and incorporated charitable
or religious associations, the Committee should consider the desirability of
including in its proposed Ohio Non-Profit Corporation Law a section to
'BIcKs, CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF REALTY 7 (1946).
e116 N.E.2d 215 (Ohio App. 1953).
T28 OHIO BAR 17, 135 (1955).
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cover the situation in which a non-profit corporation has conveyed real estate
without a court order and the grantee's tide did not become valid under
Section 10055 prior to its repeal. Although the primary purpose of this
committee is the preparation of a Non-Profit Corporation Law it might
properly consider the desirability of a special statute which would validate
conveyances of real estate by trustees of unincorporated charitable organiza-
tions which conveyances were still voidable when Section 10055 was
repealed by the adoption of the Ohio Revised Code.
Delivery
The legal requirement that a deed conveying an interest in real prop-
erty must be delivered to be effective is a well recognized and elementary
rule. But, men learned in the law at times differ as to whether or not there
has been delivery in a particular case. Such a situation occurred in
Kniebbe v. WadMs in which the Ohio Supreme Court with one judge dis-
senting and the Chief Justice not participating reversed the court of appeals
and the court of common pleas. In this case, H and W, husband and wife,
owned four parcels of land as tenants in common. Each spouse executed
for each parcel of land an absolute deed which purported to convey the
grantor's undivided half interest as tenant in common to the other spouse
who already owned an undivided half interest in the same land as tenant
in common. The eight deeds (four signed by H and four signed by W)
were duly executed in the office of a real estate agent and then were taken
home by V and placed in a box to which both H and V had access. After
H's death V recorded the four deeds to her from H. A child of H by a
prior marriage filed a petition against V for a declaratory judgment to de-
termine the validity of these deeds. The court of common pleas and the
court of appeals both upheld the deeds from W to H and declared the deeds
-from W to H to be ineffective. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed these
decisions and held that all the deeds were testmentary and therefore in-
valid for want of delivery.
Although the facts in Kniebbe v. Wade are not entirely dear, the case
has some of the aspects of conditional delivery of deeds by the grantor to the
grantee. The condition is that the grantee must survive the grantor and
not merely that the grantor must die. The general rule is that conditional
delivery of a deed is absolute delivery.' Consequently, the statement by
the Ohio Supreme Court that "manual transfer of a deed does not consti-
tute delivery unless it is coupled with an intent of a present, immediate and
unconditional conveyance of tide' seems to deny the general rule with re-
'161 Ohio St. 294, 118 N.E.2d 833 (1954).
'3 Am. LAw oF PORoaPoRT 316 (1952).
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spect to conditional delivery. But, when this language is read in connec-
tion with the statement that H had access to the box in which the deeds
were kept and that H took some deeds from this box and destroyed them,
the language simply means that the deeds were ambulatory, that is testa-
mentary.
If the deeds had been properly written and delivered, H could have con-
veyed by W by deed an executory interest (sometimes called a springing use)
so that if H predeceased W, H's undivided half interest in each of the four
parcels would vest in W. W could have made the same type of convey-
ance to H to vest if W predeceased H. These deeds could have been re-
corded immediately after their delivery.
If the four testamentary deeds from H to W in Kniebbe v. Wade were
executed in accordance with the Ohio statutory formalities for the execution
of wills, would such deeds be sufficiently testamentary to be probated as
H's will?10
Description
A perfect description of a tract of land is one which accurately describes
all sides of the tract so that at any future time the tract can be located on the
ground without reference to any natural or artificial monuments which may
be used to mark the sides of the tract at the time the description is written.
Descriptions of this type are possible but they are presently unusual in
Ohio.
Haller v. Holthousel was an action to quiet title to a sixty-three foot
strip of land. A secretary in a law office who was inexperienced in the
writing of descriptions inadvertently included in the deed to plaintiff
Haller a fifty-one-foot strip of land in the description of a twelve-foot
strip. The court ordered the reformation of this deed because the acts of
the plaintiff Hailer and the defendant Holthouse, who claimed title to the
fifty-one foot strip under a later deed from plaintiff's grantor, after plaintiff
and defendant received their respective deeds, dearly and convincingly
showed that -both parties -believed that the plaintiffs deed conveyed only
the twelve-foot strip.
The inadequacy of discriptions of land which rely on natural or arti-
ficial monuments is obvious from the statement of the court in Sinclair
Refining Co. v. Romohr.'2 The court said that from the evidence in the
case "it appears that there are no authentic monuments in the village of
Blanchester from which lot lines can be definitely located."
"In re EdwaU's Estate, 75 Wash. 391, 134 Pac. 1041 (1913); 1 PAGE, WILLS 132
(1941).
121 N.E.2d 662 (Ohio App. 1952).
"95 Ohio App. 93, 117 N.E.2d 489 (1953).
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Although a highway is a monument and monuments as a general rule
prevail over courses and distances, this rule is inapplicable when the exact
location of the boundaries of the highway are not known. In Broadsword v.
Kauer1 the Ohio State Highway Director contended that the width of
Highway No. 45 is 99 feet and that the width of Highway No. 224 is 132
feet at their intersection. The trial court found that the width of Highway
No. 224 is fifty feet and the width of Highway No. 45 is sixty feet. The
court of appeals agreed with the highway director, but the Ohio Supreme
Court agreed with the trial court. This case reveals the possible need for a
state-wide program to establish and mark the boundaries of all tracts of
land which are publicly owned. A program to establish the boundaries to
all publicly owned lands and to rewrite the descriptions to assure future relo-
cation of these boundaries even though all markers may disappear would
be a big step toward the establishment of accurate tract indices by county for
all land in the state.
In Greenberg v. L. L Snodgrass Co.14 the Ohio Supreme Court properly
held that when a grantor has title to the center of a vacated street a convey-
ance of a lot which adjoins the street includes the portion of the street
owned by the grantor unless it is expressly excluded. The fact that the
description called for a line "west with the south line of McGregor Avenue"
did not indicate that the grantor intended to retain tide to the southern
half of McGregor Avenue which abutted the lot conveyed. The court did
not consider whether this rule would apply if the grantor owned two lots
directly opposite to each other on a vacated street and conveyed only one
lot without expressly including or excluding any portion of the street.
However, in order to promote general uniformity with respect to the owner-
ship of land to the center of the street, the fact that a grantor owned a lot
directly across the street from the lot conveyed should be immaterial.
Mineral Rights
In Franklin v. Callicoatr5 the plaintiff asked the court to enjoin the
defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's exercise of his alleged right
to strip-mine the defendant's farm. Plaintiff is the successor to the mineral
rights with respect to defendanes farm which were conveyed in 1905 by a
recorded deed to plaintiff's grantor by George Corn whose interest the de-
fendant now owns. Although, some of the language of the deed of 1905
to plaintiff's grantor is sufficiently broad to include the right to strip-mine,
the court construed this broad language as use at a time when strip mining
" 161 Ohio St. 524, 120 N.E.2d 111 (1954).
' 161 Ohio St. 351, 119 N.E.2d 292 (1954).
"119 N.E.2d 688 (Lawrence Com. AL 1954).
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was unknown and in connection with other language of this deed which re-
quired pipes to be laid at a sufficient depth "so as not to interfere with the
agricultural purposes." This decision is in accord with the general principle
of construing a deed in its entirety. Another factor which enabled the court
to protect the owner of the surface is the fact that the deed to plaintiff's
grantor did not negative the duty of the owner of minerals to support the
surface but indirectly set forth this duty by its reference to use of the surface
for agricultural purposes.
Partition
The action for partition in Elliott v. Jerman.' is very interesting. Ac-
cording to the opinion of the court, the plaintiff alleged that she had an un-
divided one-third interest in certain real property and that each of three
defendants had a one-third interest in the same property! The defendants
failed to answer, and the court entered a decree finding the interests of the
parties to be as alleged in the petition! But the court was able to avoid the
problem of dividing the net proceeds from the sale of the property into
four equal portions of one-third each, because one of the defendants and
-her daughter filed a petition to set aside the court's decree on the ground
that all the owners of the property were not made defendants and that
the decree ordered distribution to certain persons who owned no interest in
the property. Although the plaintiff insisted upon distribution to the
persons who claimed no interest in the property, the court was able to set
aside its earlier decree and to do justice because partition is an equitable
action.
Eminent Domain
The cases involving eminent domain are numerous and varied. The
power of eminent domain was asserted by an agricultural society to obtain
land for agricultultural fairs; 7 by a Delaware corporation to obtain a right
of way in Ohio for its pipe line;'" by a city transit system to obtain an addi-
tional right of way;' 9 by a state turnpike authority to obtain an easement
which would prohibit the erection of signs on land which adjoins a turn-
pike;20 by a state director of highways to relocate certain highways; 21 by
1 116 N.E.2d 50 (Franklin Com. Pl. 1953).
'Fayette County Agricultural Society v. Scott, 96 Ohio App. 6, 121 N.E.2d 118
(1953).
'
1 Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 120 N.E.2d 137, 143
(Columbiana Prob. Ct. 1953).
"Cleveland v. Langenau, 120 N.E.2d 751 (Ohio App. 1954).
'Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 162 Ohio St. 86, 120 N.E.2d 719 (1954).
'Claim of Kincade, 95 Ohio App. 329, 119 N.E.2d 314 (1953); In re McKay's
Estate, 121 N.E.2d 300 (Ohio App. 1953).
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an electric power company to obtain a right of way for its lines;22 by a city to
sell land dedicated many years ago as a public market;23 and -by another
city to use for a new public office building and jail the land which had
been dedicated many years ago as a public market.24
Some of these eminent doman cases merit additional comment. In all
of these cases except one the respective courts were liberal in upholding
the right of the party who relied upon the power of eminent domain. Only
the state turnpike authority was denied the rights it sought.
In Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co.25 the plaintiff,
a Delaware corporation, obtained its power of eminent domain from the
federal government and secured the approval of an Ohio probate court to
bring its action in the Ohio probate court on the theory that: (a) there
is no Ohio statute specifically excluding the use of Ohio probate courts by
corporations incorporated outside Ohio and to which the federal govern-
ment has granted the power of eminent domain; (b) the term "corporation"
in the Ohio statute which grants to the Ohio probate courts jurisdiction
over condemnation proceedings is not restricted to Ohio corporations;
(c) Ohio courts have exercised jurisdiction over naturalization and rent
control cases without any specific grant of jurisdiction .by the Ohio legisla-
ture; (d) Ohio has a general policy of cooperating with the federal gov-
ernment; (e) Ohio has authorized its courts to determine cases involving
condemnation actions by the federal government.
On the theory that law was designed and intended to serve the or-
ganized society of mankind, not to stifle or cripple man's effort to grow,
advance and prosper, the Muskingum County Common Pleas Court up-
held the right of the City of Zanesville to use for a public office building
and jail certain land which had been dedicated about 150 years ago as a
public market.2 6 The city did not have to pay compensation to any person
because no person had any interest in the land after it was dedicated as a
public market. Consequently, no private property was taken for public use.
Whenever the land is no longer used for a public office building and jail,
it reverts according to the court, to a public market if the city does not
determine to use it for some other public purposes.
The case of Babin v. Ashland27 which was decided by the Ohio Supreme
' Ohio Power Co. v. Shroyer, 122 N.E.2d 304 (Ohio App. 1954).
"Babin v. Ashland, 160 Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953).
'Zanesville v. Zanesville Canal & Mfg. Co., 116 N.E.2d 54 (Muskingum Com.
Pl. 1953).
120 N.E.2d 137 (Columbiana Prob. Ct. 1953).
-'Zanesville v. Zanesville Canal & Mfg. Co., 116 N.E.2d 54 (Muskingum Com.
P1. 1953).
' 160 Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953).
1955)
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Court frees the cities of Ohio from the control of the dead hand. The court
held that a city by ordinance and without any special condemnation proceed-
ing may authorize the sale of land held by the city -in trust for the public as
a market place because the sale was in the public interest and the grantor
had retained no interest in the land after it was dedicated as a market.
The Fayette County Court of Appeals in Fayette County Agricultural
Soc. v. Scott28 seems to misconstrue the applicable statute by defining the
term "application" as meaning the hearing and not the instituting of the
condemnation action. The statute required the agricultural society to serve
notice of the time and place of application upon the owner of the land to
be taken under the power of eminent domain. This notice had to be "served
five days before the time of application." The court of appeals failed to
realize that the giving of notice of an intention to bring a certain action
may be beneficial. Consequently, the court in effect rewrote the statute to
fit its decision that notice had to be given five days before the hearing and
not five days before instituting the action. Fortunately, this odd con-
struction of the statute is not the sole basis of the decision of the court in
favor of the agricultural society. The court properly held that the land-
owners by their general appearance waived any defects with respect to
notice. The concurring opinion by Judge Hornbeck is acceptable because
it is based upon waiver of notice.
State Authorities
The title of this subdivision might have been "turnpikes." But turn-
pikes are only one form of state authority and therefore a broader title
seemed desirable because of the possibility of future litigation involving
state authorities other than turnpikes which will merit consideration in the
annual survey.
The Ohio Supreme Court on State ex rel Ohio Turnpike Commission; v.
Elyria" held that the City of Elyria has no duty under Ohio statutes to deter-
mine at the request of the Turnpike Commission new locations which the
city deems best for the relocation of a public road and water lines which the
Turnpike Commission found had to be relocated.
Water Rights
It is possible that Ohio may adopt the theory of reasonable use with
respect to surface water. The rule of reasonable use is superior to either the
civil-law rule that an owner of land must allow surface water to drain on to
his land in its usual and natural way or the common-law rule, sometimes
'96 Ohio App. 6, 121 N.E.2d 118 (1953).
' 161 Ohio St. 363, 119 N.E.2d 297 (1954).
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